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VALUE A N D  FREEDOM IN M A N  A N D  UNIVERSE 
LEFT with you the question, Why is belief in determin- I ism depressing? T h e  answer which many are disposed 
to  give is that it is not ! T h e  physiologist or psychologist or 
sociologist who is getting on with his efforts to  find causal 
connections in human behavior is not alone not depressed; 
he has the excitement and pleasure which attend all scientific 
advance. I t  is only the realization of what a completed 
determinism means that is depressing-not to  the observer, 
but to  the observed, the human being as a person acting in 
his own right. 
T h e  primary reason for his trouble is his discovery that, 
if he is all-caused, he, in common with other men, never 
really does anyth ing .  Everything is done ultimately by the 
physical universe, (which has the disadvantage of not know- 
ing what it does). W e  may be said to  do  things precisely 
as any machine does things. We are transformers of energy, 
and things happen differently than they would if we were 
not in the world. Things happen differently because loco- 
motives are in the world, and surely the locomotive pulls 
the train. But we make the locomotives, so it is we who 
pull the train; and Nature makes us, so it is Nature which 
makes the locomotives and pulls the train. Indirectly Na-  
ture does all that is done in this universe: it is all the neces- 
sary consequence of the most ancient constellations of fact 
operating under the laws of fact. Hence we are under an 
illusion-or let us say a half-illusion: we think we do things, 
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and so we do, because the ancient stream of energy flows 
through our switch-box; but we also fancy that we do things 
as originators, thinking our own thoughts, using an initiative 
which is our own and no other’s-and there on this theory 
we are wrong, for  Nature produces the thoughts also. 
Looking a t  the process of history as a whole, we have to  
take the sum of all such private reflections and say that  the 
history of tomorrow is already written. W e  are not ad- 
mitted to the secret, but what we shall do  is settled in the 
shaping of all earlier facts. Our several careers are already 
marked out and in principle knowable. T h e  outcome of the 
war is determined, and of all that will come after the war. 
W e  shall continue to  plan, strive, and suffer, for these efforts 
are par t  of the picture of what shall come. I t  is perhaps 
this that most appalls us, that  we cannot in any way change 
the amount of caring and striving we are predestined to  
perform, since our loving and hating, fearing and fighting, 
are already printed on the everlasting film which inexorably 
unrolls itself, not knowing what it does. 
There  are those who would draw the sting of this puppet- 
picture of human life by saying that, if all things are deter- 
mined, nothing is changed. All inner relations remain as they 
are (just as they do when we accept the assumption that we 
see everything upside down) : our feelings of interest, effort ,  
triumph, yes, the sense of free-origination itself, all fall into 
their natural sequence and make precisely the same sense 
that they now seem to make. I t  is doubtless this that  Spinoza 
had in mind when he wrote about the causes which bring 
about our volitions : 
T h e r e  is not in the mind a will absolute and f ree ;  but  the mind is so 
conditioned as to  be caused to will this or  that ,  by some cause which is 
determined by another cause, and this by another and so to  infinity.’ . . . 
'Ethics, ii, prop. 48, as quoted by Sir Charles Sherrington in M a n  on his 
Nature, loc .  cit., p. 199. 
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Men think themselves free, because they a re  conscious of their volitions 
and of their desires and are  oblivious of the causes which dispose them 
to desire and t o  will.’ 
And it may be the sense of the remark which Sir Charles 
Sherrington appends to  this, his quotation from Spinoza : 
. , . f rom the human standpoint, the important thing is less tha t  man’s 
will should be free than tha t  man should think tha t  i t  is free. T h a t  can 
indeed serve to  activate and sustain his zest-for-life.2 
This comment, however, is an admission that the belief in 
freedom is necessary to  activate and sustain the zest-for-life ; 
and while it is quite in order before one has seen the hoax, 
it is hard to  maintain it afterward, or to see how it can 
reasonably be maintained. 
T h e  deepest impulse in man is the will to be effective, 
to amount to something, to be a cause. Under the view of 
determinism this effectiveness remains, not as mine but as of 
something which passes across my being. W e  are asked to  be 
satisfied with this passage. T h e  fact that our power is loaned, 
and that its deeds are mapped out for it, does not cancel 
the fact that  it is power, nor that it is a cause. Every cause 
is an effect, but none the less has its day as a cause. T h e  
energies of the world are older than the sun and have run 
through all time, but now they run through us, and we are 
the makers of the next stage of the world’s life. This is 
not alone plausible; it  is quite true. But it fails t o  reach the 
heart of the trouble. T h e  power that concerns me is not the 
power to lift a weight, nor to  change my neighbor’s vote, 
but the power to  decide, to invent something new, to  devise 
a possibility which apart  from my thought the universe did 
not contain, and to  bring that possibility into existence. 
I t  is because determinism eliminates this particular, speci- 
fic, and essentially human form of power that it is a subtly 
‘Ibid., Prop. 48, appendix. 
2 L o c .  cit., p. 199. 
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depressing doctrine. Everyone who first grasps its implica- 
tion feels as i f  cold steel had passed through him, even when 
he fails to  understand the source of this touch of death. 
Is science, then, irrevocably committed to  determinism? 
I .  T H E  POSTULATES OF BIOLOGY 
Biology itself is caught between two postulates which 
lead to  opposite answers in regard to  the r61e of the mind. 
One is that no organ is evolved which does not have some 
biological utility; the other, that  the whole chain of physical 
phenomena has other physical phenomena as antecedents 
and nothing but physical phenomena. T h e  former postulate 
would imply that, since the mind has evidently evolved in 
the animal series, it has some biological utility. T h e  latter 
postulate would imply that since behavior is physical its 
antecedents must be all physical and not mental. T h e  physi- 
ologist has never to look for a mental link in the series of 
events between stimulus and response ; whence, the mental 
phenomena have no utility a t  all-they merely accompany 
the brain-and-nerve phenomena which do  the work. Biolo- 
gists like other people fall into the verbal expressions which 
imply that human and animal wills affect events. They speak 
of impulses, desires, satisfactions, habits, but they are aware 
of the peril in this concession to  usage and have even devised 
mind-proof terminologies, as did Beer, Bethe, and Uexkuell, 
in which no psychological suggestion should be found. In 
the struggle between these opposing postulates the mechan- 
ical ideal tends to win out;  but there remains an uneasiness 
over the question, Why-if the mind has no difference to  
make in the behavior of organisms-did it ever make its ap- 
pearance and then develop its insecure cranny to  such mar- 
velous dimensions ? 
Herbert  Spencer’s psychology appears t o  reconcile these 
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two postulates. H e  rejects any freedom of the will which 
would make a difference in the causal march of events 
through the organic body. A t  the same time, we have an ex- 
perience of being free which is not illusory. F o r  our wishes 
and desires are, so fa r  as our experience goes, the instru- 
ments by which Nature wins her way with us. H i s  statement 
has a remarkable conciseness and clarity; in substance it is 
this : 
If you mean by freedom doing as w e  please then w e  are all free. F o r  
w e  always do as w e  please. T h e  point is, t h a t  w e  cannot do anything else. 
And w e  cannot please as we please.‘ 
By determining what pleases us, Nature determines what we 
do. T h e  course of our mental life is then wholly compatible 
with a perfect causal mesh in the field of the physiology of 
the nervous system. 
Now James was never as beautifully clear as this, nor as 
consistent. Fo r  laboratory purposes he was willing to  insist 
as firmly as H. S. Jennings on experimental determinism. 
But when he tries to  answer the question, How do we know 
when an organism is conscious? he assumes that the mind 
makes a difference. 1% creature is conscious, he says, if  its 
behavior shows “a pursuit of ends, with a choice of means.” 
W e  see a horse reaching for a bunch of hay on the floor just 
beyond the reach of his nose: he is pursuing an end! If he 
fails to  get it by one posture, he tries another, perhaps paws 
a t  it with his foreleg, perhaps whinnies a little as if to get 
a man to work on the problem: he chooses means. Ergo ,  
me say, the horse is conscious-has a mind! ,411 this is non- 
‘This passage, from Principles of  P s y c l i o l o y y ,  Yo]. 11, i s  presumably later 
than the sixth edition of First Principlrs, in which he changed his statement 
of the relation of mind and body. I n  the first edition he treated the mind as 
a form of energy, and regarded it as on the level with heat, light, etc. (see 
his chapter on “The Correlation and Transformation of Forces”). But he 
later saw the impossibility of measuring consciousness in C.G.S. units, and so 
attempted a view in later editions which approached the “two-aspect theory,” 
though it  never reached a form satisfactory to himself. 
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sense from the point of view of the laboratory. No one can 
identify an “end” in strictly scientific description ; and hence 
not a means, James’s language is highly objectionable; but 
it is there. Further, he believes there is such a thing as “will,” 
and as a psychologist he is obliged to  say what it is. 
Savagely condensed, James’s answer amounts to this : 
Whatever the organism has done by way of random or 
reflex movements, we can recall the motor-experience of. 
And whatever motor-experience we think of intently, we 
tend to  carry out. If you think of yourself grinning, you grin. 
Will consists in giving one such image-of-action our un- 
divided attention, with perhaps an extra flick of consent or 
signal-giving called a “fiat.” In any case, will is the name 
for a state of mind which stands as the immediate prede- 
cessor of an action, and appears to  release the causal ener- 
gies of the “voluntary” muscles. 
N o w  the puzzle of all this, from the purely physiological 
point of view, is “Why any state of consciousness a t  all 
should precede a movement”’-and James confesses he does 
not know the answer. W h a t  are the real and determinative 
antecedents of that  physical phenomenon we call a volun- 
tary ac t?  Does our “trying hard” to act, o r  to think of 
action, o r  to  think of anything-does this inner exertion of 
ours which we call “willing” accomplish anything in the 
world of facts? James thinks that on psychological grounds 
there is no solution, makes a few vague suggestions about 
“empirical evidence,” admits that he finds it hard to believe 
that thinking is a wholly useless activity,* and lets the mat- 
ter go over into a higher court. 
W e  all know what James’s higher court decided. I t  de- 
’William James, Principles of Psychology  (New York: Henry Holt, 18go), 
21bid., p. 571. 
V O l .  11, p. 495. 
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cided on pragmatic grounds that the will must be an effective 
agent in the actual physical changes we call behavior. James 
rejects those easy solutions of the old puzzle which say that 
from one point of view an act is free and from another the 
same act is determined: if you are describing behavior in 
terms of cause and effect, you find that it is all so descri- 
bable; if you are evalzrating it  in terms of its goals, you 
find that it is all purposed; hence there is no real issue. Kant 
solved the matter that way: freedom was simply the “in- 
telligible” version of what was on the physical plane neces- 
sitated ; so Fechner, so Paulsen, so Royce-who contrived 
the expressions, “the world of description” and “the world 
of appreciation” to  express the difference of the angle of 
regard. According to these proponents of the “identity 
theory,” i f  a murderer decides to pull the trigger and his 
victim falls, all the finger-action on the trigger, since it be- 
longs to the measurable world of cause and effect, had to be 
from all eternity just what it was: the murderer never had 
the choice, “ to  pull o r  not to pull” ; the only element of free- 
dom was in the play of emotive color around the general 
concepts of law and life that may have taken place in his 
reflective self during this event. T o  James this seemed a 
travesty on the whole meaning of freedom. And here, I 
confess, I applaud James’s flat-footed common sense. Free- 
dom, if it means anything, means the reality of concrete 
alternatives; and it can only exist in a world in which there 
is an open issue between “to pull or not to pull,” an issue that 
is not closed until the willing agent closes it. 
Where James’s answer is unsatisfactory is in the nature 
of his higher court-the pragmatic method. I t  was the defect 
of the pragmatic method that James could acquit himself of 
trying to  give a genuine solution. T o  point out that we have 
a vital stake in the matter was important, but to  suppose 
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that the importance could settle the matter was a fallacy, 
No matter how depressing determinism may be, no matter 
how important it is that  men consider themselves responsi- 
ble in the concrete for  what they do, these concerns do not 
constitute a settlement-they are nothing more than grounds 
for  hazarding an hypothesis, i f  we have no time to think it 
T h e  real relation is reversed by pragmatism. W e  do not 
judge determinism false because it is depressing; we are 
depressed by it because a t  bottom we know it isn’t true! T h e  
whole picture it gives of the world and man’s place in it is 
so grotesque, so passivized, so tied-up, so horribly untun- 
ing of all the springs of conscious life, so closed-in toward 
the future, so stingy of possibility, so empty of novelty, so 
vacuous of all motive for  living, that  no live man can draw 
a full breath in its atmosphere without feeling poisoned. 
out. 
I t  is not true. But if not, where is the fallacy? 
T o  that neither James nor Royce have given an answer, 
and an answer is demanded, whether by the scientist o r  the 
man in the street. Fortunately, it is science itself which now 
affords the means for  the answer. 
2 .  PSYCHOLOGICAL LAWS VALID ONLY BY CONSENT 
The  first point t o  observe is that the scientist who carries 
his experimental determinism over into the explanation of 
human behavior is forgetting himself. In  his examination 
of physical things, to  forget himself is his duty. But when 
he is making a psychological observation, he is the observer, 
and he is also the being observed; this twofold r6le of the 
observing psychologist cannot be forgotten without distort- 
ing the results. And once you recall that  the observer is in 
some respect substantially different from the observed self, 
the deterministic apple-cart is definitely overturned ! 
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F o r  it is only the observed self that can be considered 
a caused self. 
Suppose, for example, we were in the position of a char- 
acter in Ibsen’s “Ghosts,” reflecting on his own heredity, and 
arguing as follows: 
Whatever  a man does is the  joint product of all the causes, of heredity 
and environment, tha t  play upon him. I recognize the working in me of 
ancestral dispositions. My father was  a tippler; now as I settle down for 
an evening with the bottle, I can perceive the growing power of habit 
upon me ;  very soon I shall be a drunkard also. I see my fu ture  self 
being caused: there is nothing I can do to prevent it. 
One feels a certain insincerity in the reflection. T h e  man who 
recognizes the causes may be making an accurate observa- 
tion, but what he is failing to observe is that his very ob- 
servation is putting him in a position of detachment from 
the caused self. Either he likes what he sees happening or 
he does not like i t ;  i f  he does not like it, he is in a position 
to change it, just on account of the objectivity involved in 
the position of observer. (This position is quite different 
from that of his father, for it has the paternal career in its 
entirety as one of its data. As Bergson has observed, there 
are in conscious experience no repetitions, and therefore 
no precise footholds for laws of recurrence such as all causal 
formulations are. But our point is a different one. T h e  
absence of exact repetition is also true of physical situations 
and does not invalidate the application of causal formulae, 
which are always dealing with abstractions from the concrete 
total event.) Our point is that the emotional bias, insepara- 
ble from the function of observing a causal series termi- 
nating in oneself, is a factor instantly siispertding the con- 
tiirziity of the  causal process and subjecting it to a judgment 
of approval or disapproval. If the observer omits to note 
his own presence in the total factual situation, he omits, not 
a detail, but the crucial factor of its denouement. 
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This  situation has already received attention from the 
logicians, both of ancient and recent times. I t  is of the es- 
sence of the famous paradox of Epimenides the Cretan, 
who announces that “All Cretans are liars.” If his state- 
ment is true, he is himself a l iar ;  and then if his statement 
is in character i t  is false. If, however, the statement is false, 
he may be telling the truth, in which case he is a liar. Now 
this merry bit of self-tripping logomachy is one which 
Principia Mathematica first attempted to  solve by the 
Theory of Types, which set up a sort of police regulation 
whereby no proposition is allowed to  refer t o  itself. Under  
this rule the proposition that all Cretans are liars may refer 
t o  all other statements made by Cretans, remaining itself 
immune from the damaging comment. This  solution is un- 
satisfactory, however, because there are so many proposi- 
tions which obviously must be allowed to  refer to  themselves, 
such as this, that  “every proposition either affirms or denies 
something.” T h e  solution must lie in recognizing the in- 
tention of the speaker-whether he does or does not intend 
to include his own statement in the sweep of his statement 
about statements. 
This  factor of intention may be illustrated in a concrete 
illustration which I owe to  Professor Wertheimer. Some 
years ago attendants a t  the Psychopathic Hospital in Berlin 
were wakened by a persistent knocking shortly after mid- 
night. A man a t  the door demanded admission as a patient. 
“lch bin verriickt,” he said: “I am crazy.” Regulations of 
the hospital required that  no one be admitted as a patient 
except on the certification of two physicians, but as no physi- 
cians were available a t  that  hour, and as the prospective 
patient showed every sign of consent to  his own admission, 
and as it seemed inhumane to  turn him away, it was decided 
in the emergency to  accept him for  examination. T h e  ex- 
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amination showed that he was in fact insane, and he was 
continued for treatment. Relatives of this man, however, 
complained of the irregular procedure, and brought suit. 
Their case rested on the circumstance that if the patient had 
rightly diagnosed his own insanity, he cannot have been in- 
sane. If he was right, he was wrong. 
T h e  situation is logically perplexing only so long as we 
fail t o  distinguish the judging self from the self judged. 
If we maintain their complete identity, we make any self- 
criticism logically impossible, for if a man sees something 
evil in himself, he must be either good or evil in making the 
judgment. If his self-criticism is true, he is a good judge in 
judging himself to be evil. If  he must be an unjust judge 
when he judges himself to  be unjust, he is effectively estopped 
from ever admitting his own injustice. But since just self- 
criticism must be and is possible, the judging self must be 
able to  extricate itself from the condemnation which it 
issues upon itself. T h a t  is to say, the self which is made the 
target of criticism is in that act of judgment consciously set 
off from the self which is criticizing. A man may with clear 
sight perceive his sight to  be habitually unclear. 
From this point of view, we may say that any man who 
makes about himself an unfavorable generalization, such as 
this, “I am lazy,” “I am too irritable to get on well with 
anybody,” “I am one of these introverts, and can never 
brace up to  the demands of the hard facts of life,” anyone 
who makes such a statement with intentional disapproval 
may perfectly well be correct in his judgment with regard 
to the self he has in mind. If, however, he intends this judg- 
ment to  apply to his whole self, including the self that judges, 
he is always Zyiizg, because the self which takes that criti- 
cized self into an objectified and disapproved regard a t  that 
moment, is exercising a justified rejection, free from the 
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criticized defect, and also holds the balance of p o w e r  as to  
the  quality of t h e  next  action, whether it shall continue the 
character of the self which is judging or  the character of the 
self which is judged. 
F o r  the same reason, any psychological generalization 
about any person, which is an unwelcome generalization, 
becomes false just as soon as that  person becomes aware of 
it. If some observer judges that I am “lazy and good for  
nothing,” he may be quite right: but if he communicates that 
judgment to  me, and I do  not like it, he immediately becomes 
wrong, if only for  that  moment. It is the precise function of 
many such generalizations to  make themselves false. When 
we become impatient with our neighbors and “tell them 
what we think of them,” we often do so with the secret hope 
that  these neighbors will stir themselves to  prove that we 
have slandered them. Admonitions of parents to  children 
are frequently charged with this benevolent prevarication. 
‘&You slovenly little rascal; your room is a horror”-is a 
type of language whose intention is to  provoke the moment 
of repudiating self-consciousness. I should not like to insist 
that  all education of character requires to  be carried on by 
falsehood: but I do point out that  to associate one’s own re- 
buke with the child’s self-rebuke (o r  vice versa) ’ making 
conscious use of the non-identity between the condemned self 
and the self-which-condemns-that technique is essential in 
all ethical growth. 
In  brief, the distinction between a physical science and a 
mental science is this: the laws which hold good of physical 
nature remain valid whether I like them or  not ;  the laws 
which can be formulated about mental nature remain valid 
only if I consent to  them. 
This  b r a t h e r  hard on the formulations of psychology and 
sociology, for  these sciences are  most successful just a t  the 
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points a t  which our conduct is most objectionable. They can 
most enlighten us by explaining our errors and irrationali- 
ties. This  is, in fact, outside of elementary psycho-physics, 
the only region of our conduct that  is capable of causal ex- 
planation. I t  is wholly impossible for  any natural science 
to  explain why in performing mathematical calculation you 
get the right answer. If you get the wrong answer, there 
must be a cause-fatigue, eye-strain, interruption, forget- 
fulness, psychical blindness, an anti-mathematical complex 
under which some people needlessly suffer, specific number- 
phobias-any one or  more of a hundred intruding incidents 
may throw you from the right track. Only, the right track 
itself has no causes, because it is no function of any space- 
time variable : no alteration of temperature, latitude, baro- 
metric pressure, o r  of your own state of health affects or 
has any relevance to  the validity of the famous formula two 
and two are four. T h e  multiplication table is not a psycho- 
logical phenomenon ; our difficulties with it are.  I t  is for this 
reason that popular treatises on psychology are  filled with 
the record of human foibles, irrationalities, even vices : these 
are the things capable of explanation. T h e  impression is 
strongly conveyed that man is after all a creature of irra- 
tional impulses and his endocrine secretions. Wha t  is not 
insisted on is the more important feature of human nature : 
not one of those irrationalities remains valid, once it is dis- 
covered, a moment longer than we wish it to. 
Fo r  example, it is a generalization some psychologists 
risk that the average of men are governed more by emo- 
tional suggestion than by reason. From this law it would 
follow that if you wish to  defeat an uncompromising op- 
ponent a t  the polls it is not necessary to  show the error of 
his argument: it would be more judicious not to  argue but 
to  rouse prejudice against him. It is on this plan that the 
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publicity representative of a certain power company was 
said to  have operated when, on being asked what he would 
do to defeat a state senator who wanted a publicly-owned 
power plant, he answered “Pin the Bolshevik label on him.” 
One can very well believe that this use of the law of the 
irrationality of the Demos would be successful, but only up 
to  a particular moment, the moment when the public con- 
cerned learns what is being done to  them to deflect their 
votes: then one can imagine the speed with which the law 
ceases to  work ! 
This  phrase that I have just used is not quite accurate: 
no law ever “ceases to  work,” it merely ceases to  apply. If 
I have a prejudice, I act on that prejudice, and anyone who 
plays on that  prejudice will get my prejudiced reaction, which 
may be what he wants. But if my attention is called to  the 
fact that  I am operating on an unexamined prejudice, I do 
something like stopping payment on a check: I suspend the 
prejudice, pending examination, and the man who then ap- 
peals to  it finds that  it is not doing business as usual. This  
power of suspending the factual mental conditions on which 
causal laws take hold is what we mean by freedom. And 
because of this power, those pseudo-laws which pretend to  
say what human beings will do under various circumstances 
are  always being invalidated by the unlimited resources of 
human nature. I t  is a prediction from such a pseudo-law that 
“Bombing civilian populations will lead them to sue fo r  
peace” : it has been tried, first on Spain, then on China, then 
on England, and each time the resources of human nature 
suspended the reflex outflow of its own pain and terror. 
Freedom means no cancellation of genuine causal laws- 
such as that mental vigor cannot continue without food and 
drink and a sufficiency of iodine-and no denial of “tend- 
encies,” but it means that no such law operates alone within 
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the organism: it operates as a factor within a purpose. And 
no condition to which such a law could apply will remain, 
unless it has the continued consent of that purpose. This 
means that the total law of human behavior is lzot causa2, 
though it contains a whole cable of causal strands, which 
remain there by consent. While it is possible to  predict par- 
tial elements of behavior, especially when the subject being 
predicted about is unaware of the prediction, it is never 
possible to  predict the conduct of a human being in its total 
shape. 
And finally this means that the determinists are concretely 
wrong; and that men may reasonably be called upon to rouse 
themselves to  deeds which, apart  from their free decisions, 
will simply not happen in the universe.l 
3. THE VALUE OF MAN 
Now, if man is free in the sense we have defined, this 
freedom has everything to do  with his value. A t  the moment 
of his free act, he is Archimedes: with his lever he moves 
the world. I t  is this capacity which makes the essential dif- 
ference between the man, the animal, and the thing. 
In his own eyes the value of man is closely connected with 
his freedom. I believe that Sir Charles Sherrington’s phrase 
is a good one- it bears on his zest-for-life. But more than 
that, it bears on his self-respect and on his respect for the 
rest of his kind. 
So with our attitude to  others: we cannot fully respect 
those whom we do  not regard as free. W e  have no obligation 
to  share with them our emotional life. When a bar of hot 
‘The question, How freedom is possible, is one which opens at this point, 
and which requires from the scientific point of view an answer. The  mathe- 
matics arising from the theory of relativity have, I believe, provided the 
necessary tools for this answer. I may here say simply that I find the con- 
siderations of Minkowski’s Memoir of 1908 the most pertinent to our problem. 
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iron is drawn through a die to  make wire, we are  not con- 
cerned with the sentiments of the iron. When we propose 
to make use of a causal law in affecting the behavior of our 
fellow men, we assume the same position of separation from 
his emotions : of course, he has emotions and purposes where 
the iron has not, but we utilize them for  our needs: it is the 
a r t  of the exploiter to  play on these emotions without being 
moved himself. H e  is in the literal position of the unmoved 
mover of Aristotle, but with a private axe to  grind. Now the 
law of loyalty between man and man is that  no one has a 
right to move others except by way of his own emotion. 
Honest persuasion seeks to  come to agreement on values, 
that is, to  induce in others the feeling which one entertains 
toward the ends of action: it respects the freedom of the 
other person, to be moved to  action solely by his own esti- 
mate of worth. In  this relation there is no opportunity for  
the unavowed use of causal laws. 
Freedom, then, is a necessary condition of the value of 
man either in his own eyes or in that  of his fellow man;  and 
to  treat  men as if they had free wills is the first meaning of 
the term equality. Those who use psychological arts on 
others are implicitly treating them as inferiors. 
Freedom, then, is a necessary condition of human worth. 
I t  is not, however, a sufficient condition. T h e  worth of life 
has also something to  do  with the contents and objects of 
existence. W h a t  can we say on this point? 
There  are  two laws of worth, or of meaning, which con- 
verge and cross in the human being: one, that  value is an 
aggregate which is composed of valuable items, or of a bal- 
ance of positive over negative items : the value of the whole 
comes from the values of the par ts ;  the other, that  value is 
a totality which descends from the whole to the parts:  if the 
whole is worthless, the parts cannot retain their charm. 
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These rules appear inconsistent; and would be so if either 
claimed to  be exclusive. In  point of psychological effect, both 
do play a par t  in human self-estimation. 
Unquestionably items of pleasure are important in con- 
ferring a positive value on the day’s experiences. A spot of 
pleasure is not, as sometimes is said, a momentary affair : its 
destiny is to  spread beyond its borders, and to raise the 
value-level of existence both by prospect and by retrospect. 
Likewise a spot of pain will depress a region of existence 
around itself-like the discomfort of an impending surgical 
operation; and a day’s length of unrelieved pain would be 
able, if intense enough, to  obliterate the whole worth of that  
stretch of existence. Pain may be said to hold a veto power 
over the value of living; though it is possible with long prac- 
tice to encyst it and flow around it. 
But, equally unquestionably, items of pleasure and pain 
do not make or  mar  the value of a life, for  over every item 
of human consciousness there hangs the awareness of the 
whole as a frame for the part ,  and what the whole is passes 
a constant stream of comment on the part. W e  may equally 
say that  the whole possesses a veto power over the quality 
of the part. T h a t  is the specifically human mode of con- 
sciousness: the animal does not worry about the whole of 
things, man is haunted by the question, Wha t  is the nature 
of the whole into which my doings fit? 
An animal does not foresee its death (though the ap- 
proach of death seems to  arouse in some species a particular 
reaction of withdrawal) ; man plans his actions with refer- 
ence to  a probable time-limit, and establishes insurance on 
the basis of his “expectation.” 
Psychologically, it is easier for any man to  say what the 
day’s work has been worth to  him than to  say what his life 
is worth. W e  know the purposes of a day or  a year better 
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than we know the purposes of a life. W h a t  do you aim a t  
professionally? This  question has a possible answer. W h a t  
do you aim a t  for  your life as a whole? This  question will 
bother all but a few persistent speculators. H o w  then do we 
come to guess the meaning of the whole? 
T o  some extent, every man takes his cue from the drift  
of his crowd; what they consider worth doing we accept as 
worth doing. Wha t  do you call a good time? There  is a gen- 
eral conception of a good time in the social a i r ;  you give a 
party based on that idea; you invite me to the party, and if 
I say this is not my idea of a good time you are not pleased 
with my originality and independence. You say to  yourself, 
“a disagreeable and opinionated wretch.” If one’s feelings 
fail to  flow in the moulds provided by the social ritual, the 
introspective exception may wonder whether something is 
wrong with him. If this almost passive valuing-with-the- 
crowd were the whole story, we should say that men impose 
on one another the attitudes toward war, hardship, death, 
which render these sufferers not intolerable companions : 
they insist on a certain stoical endurance, a reticence about 
grief, a willingness to retire from the active scene, and to  
transfer the burdens to  others, which eases the desolating 
facts of finitude. Whatever a man may feel about his own 
extinction, he must not make life harder for  his neighbors 
by transferring it to  them: bear your burdens in solitude. 
But here the individual man ceases to be either an animal 
or  a merely social animal. H e  insists on thinking beyond 
mere thoughtlessness. Where  numbness is comfort for  a bad 
prospect, like the coma preceding death, he declines the com- 
fort. H e  wants to  know what is in store for  him. This  is his 
religion. I t  is his recognition that  as a rational animal he 
cannot retain a sense of worth in his doings if the whole in 
which he is inserted has no significance. H e  does not need to  
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know what the significance is; he does need to  know that it 
is there ! 
And it is here that society also ceases to  be merely social, 
for it recognizes that the individual is right in making his 
own worth depend on the worth of the whole. I t  provides 
this support to  his morale; it sustains the institution of re- 
ligion as a public obligation. 
I t  is often assumed that this is an indirect mode of lend- 
ing sanction to  its own requirements, as Walter Bagehot 
suggests, of establishing the “cake of custom.” Religion thus 
becomes a temporary expedient for creating social stability. 
Freud has recently so exhibited its function. But these views 
omit one phase of the matter which is crucial. T h e  most 
primitive religions address themselves to  the solitary indi- 
vidual and his needs ; and if the individual is only half awak- 
ened, only half extricated from the social context, these re- 
ligions make it their first task to arouse him to separateness. 
T h e  ceremony of initiation requires solitude, fear, and pain, 
and the establishing of a wholly individual relation to  the 
other world. I t  is this sharpened individual self-conscious- 
ness which is then entrusted with the sacred lore of the tribe. 
Perhaps the societies which have not thus provided for the 
answer of the individual to his individual questions to  des- 
tiny have perished; a t  any rate this is true, that society so 
f a r  as we can trace it gets its support only as a consequence 
of first reassuring the individual of the worth of his indi- 
vidual life apart  from society. I t  is as if society had acted 
on an instinct to the effect that it had to confer worth on 
the individual, even a t  the cost of destroying his absolute 
dependence on society, in order to retain an indispensable 
morale in regard to  his own life. 
If so, this is an early instinct which a late sophistication 
has attempted to overcome, for it is just the definition of 
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the totalitarian state that the individual can have no worth 
in independence of the state. And it is the nemesis of the 
totalitarian state that  if this is the case the individual’s own 
instinct truly advises him, though by way of premonition, 
that  he has no worth a t  all. 
But how can any valuation be placed on the world as a 
whole? If the worth of a whole life is more elusive to con- 
sciousness than the worth of segments of a life, how much 
more elusive is any worth of the whole process. Is it not 
more near the judgment of common sense to  say that the 
whole is and ought to  be a background of worth, not an ob- 
ject of worth in itself? The  stage-setting may have its own 
aesthetic interest, but it ought not to  interfere with the mean- 
ings of the play. T h e  world is the stage-setting of life, not 
an independent object of value, apart  from its own aesthetic 
grandeur and sublimity. 
In allowing religion to  enter as an affirmer of value in 
the whole scene, an affirmation usually contained in the con- 
ception of God, have we not admitted that there is no sci- 
entific support for the notion, perhaps not even a semantic 
support for the use of the term “meaning” in that rela- 
tionship? 
I reply in the negative. Though science cannot affirm the 
worth of the world, nor even define what might be meant 
by that expression, neither can it deny that worth. And, as 
in the case of freedom, it must remain open to the discussion 
of the problem, how is that worth possible? 
4. T H E  WORTH O F  T H E  UNIVERSE 
On this point let me bring forward just a single and very 
simple consideration. I t  has to  do with the distinction be- 
tween the laws of Nature and the configurations of the enti- 
ties in Nature, These two elements are involved in every 
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physical discussion, and they are independent of one an- 
other: I t  is evident that, however much we know of the laws 
of motion, these laws alone give us no knowledge of where 
any body will be a t  any time. In order to  predict its future 
position we must have given the facts of its present position, 
its present velocity, and its relations to other bodies, in brief, 
a total pattern of these facts to which the laws are supposed 
to  apply. T h e  formulae of these laws must contain algebraic 
coefficients whose numerical values must be inserted in place 
before the formulae can give a numerical answer. Or ,  to put 
it in more logical language, the laws are generalities; the 
factual data regarding the position and so on of the particles 
are particulars. It requires the union of generals and par- 
ticulars to  constitute a real world. The  attention of scientists 
is naturally drafted off to  the observation of general laws. 
But some branches have likewise been devoted to the com- 
pilation of factual data, such as the Nautical Almanac, de- 
voted exclusively to configurations of the stars. 
T h e  point of this distinction is that  the configuration of 
the world is a variable independent of its laws, that  is to  
say, that  for  any given set of laws, an infinite number of as- 
sumptions may be made about the configurations to which it 
applies. And furthermore, if we begin with a given set of 
laws and a given configuration, we may possibly derive from 
those data all the future configurations of the assumed uni- 
verse, so that  the given and subsequent configurations may 
be taken as a single block of history, after the mode of the 
world-line of Minkowski. But in taking any such total his- 
tory we are unable to  make the assumption that  it will in- 
clude all t h e  possible configurations through which those 
particles could run. W e  can, in fact, demonstrate that  in 
general it will not run through all possible configurations, by 
an infinitely large factor. 
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F o r  example, our original configuration will be either 
symmetrical o r  unsymmetrical. If symmetrical, and if the 
laws in question, such as gravitation, elasticity, are such as 
apply to  all bodies without discrimination alike, then all the 
subsequent configurations will be symmetrical. If it is a t  first 
unsymmetrical, all subsequent ones will be unsymmetrical. 
None of the configurations of the first infinite series will 
coincide with any of the configurations of the second infinite 
series, Hence it is not only possible but scientifically neces- 
sary to  consider any state of the world as a configuration 
which “had to be” only in the sense that it follows from pre- 
vious configurations, not a t  all in the sense that any config- 
uration a t  all had to  be. T h e  history-as-a-whole did not have 
to  be. Whether there is any inherent necessity in the laws 
themselves-a matter which has not been demonstrated- 
there is no necessity either in the amount or the distribution 
of the entities composing Nature. They  cannot be deduced 
from the laws. 
If then we may take it as established that no configura- 
tion is from the physical point of view necessary, no series 
is necessary. T h e  idea of emergent evolution has been used 
as if there were an inherent “nisus” toward increasing com- 
plexity of form in Nature, so that the arrival a t  organic 
forms and a t  the human organism was, so to speak, on the 
cards of any material universe. This  assumption has no 
mathematical basis whatever. T h e  fundamental idea of 
emergent evolution is that a certain complication of ar- 
rangement will a t  various stages carry with it new and un- 
predictable qualities. But if no configuration is necessary, 
then no complication is necessary. In  spite of Spencer’s 
pseudo-principle of the “instability of the homogeneous,” 
there is no necessity for any increase of complication in the 
world except by virtue of an earlier configuration which 
need not have existed. 
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I defy anyone to show that any original configuration of 
the world need have been either symmetrical or unsym- 
metrical. I t  has been natural to assume that, if the world 
had a beginning in time, i t  would have started as a spherical 
nebula, o r  some other symmetrical or homogeneous shape : 
if any aesthetic motive had presided a t  such an hypothetical 
first stage, that might have been the case. But in point of 
fact, if we are to appeal to  probabilities in their complete 
disinterestedness regarding aesthetics, the symmetrical ar- 
rangement would be the most improbable of all. And if we 
were to begin with it, we could never escape from the 
clutches of its dreadful internal harmony. T h e  only develop- 
ing universe would have to be an irregular one ; and of all the 
infinite number of irregular universes, only a vanishing frac- 
tion would have any such thing as a “developing” history, 
that is t o  say, one in which any feature such as you or I 
might be interested in would proceed in ascending stages, 
like the orthogenesis of the vertebrate eye, or of the horse’s 
hoof. 
Many of the irregular universes we might imagine would 
have the mathematical character of the recurring decimal, 
a certain number of places and then repeat. If this fate, 
which was accepted by the Stoics, and by Nietzsche, were to 
be escaped, it would be by a careful choice of the irregularity 
to be a t  first lighted on!  
T h e  upshot of this line of thought is simply this: that if 
anything we consider important were to  come out of a uni- 
verse operating according to  natural laws, that something 
would have had to  be impressed specifically on the historical 
configuration. This proves nothing to the effect that the con- 
figuration of the world has been chosen, because it has de- 
bouched in us. It leaves open to  anyone to  believe if he can 
that our appearance in the universe is an accident, because 
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configuration itself is an accident. H e  may be supported in 
his views by the circumstance that so fa r  as we know, there 
are no other corners of the vast universe where such an ar- 
rival has occurred. And even if there were, it could still be 
an accident in the sense of an event devoid of either mechan- 
ical necessity or of purpose. 
But the more the probability of the arrival of such a being 
diminishes in the scale of chance, the more forced does 
such an attitude appear outside the realm of pure science 
itself. T h e  implications of configuration-let me put it thus 
-are what give the empirical foothold for  the idea of pur- 
pose on the whole of things. This  idea will be confirmed if 
we have any other grounds to  affirm it. Meantime i t  will be 
for  the scientist to  recognize the existence of a blank, which 
may or  may not be filled, without derogation to  his own 
work. This  argument I regard as a generalization, and to  
some extent a correction, of that  put forward by my late 
colleague Professor Laurence J. Henderson. 
And I have recently come upon an unsuspected confirma- 
tion. In  a visit to  the California Institute of Technology, in 
January of this year, I found the astronomer, Professor 
Fritz Zwicky, discoverer of many of the known super-novae, 
expressing his belief in a principle which he called the “pos- 
tulate of the inexhaustibility of the aspects of Nature.” H e  
felt that  this postulate has a high degree of certitude; and 
that  on it is based our human confidence in the continued 
possibility of discovery, and of important discovery, since, 
however much has been learned, there remains an unlimited 
reservoir of fundamental truth still to  be learned, and open 
to  those who start  off on new lines quite as well as to  those 
who continue the lines already established. 
T h e  human implications of this principle are obviously 
tremendous. But I content myself with observing that  it is a 
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principle of configuration, and as such one which need not be 
true; for no one can demonstrate that the world must have 
an inexhaustible wealth of aspects. If the principle is valid, 
as I suspect it is, it is another item in the invitation to  con- 
sider the universe from the standpoint of its purpose or 
meaning, and thus to support the groping of the human crea- 
ture, in many ways so humbled by the advance of our knowl- 
edge of the extent of the universe-his groping for an ex- 
terior corroboration of his self-respect. 
Thus the two values are intertwined, that of the world 
and that of the human creature in it. 
And we are not left to  mere conjecture, nor the will to 
believe, to  fill the blank space left by the scientific permission 
to  believe in worth. For  value is printed in a t  least one char- 
acter of the world, which is everywhere. I t  is in that char- 
acter of space and time which has so long puzzled both 
scientists and philosophers. Of them we can say with assur- 
ance that they do not appear to  us as private or subjective 
characters but as public characters. W e  can by an effort of 
thought realize that they might be considered as “in us’’ 
without changing their momentary quality. But belief a t  
once restores to  them the character of being common, that 
is, of being shared with others. T h e  very spontaneity of this 
unprovable acceptance of this space as our space, and of this 
world as our world (which again is among the things never 
explained o r  explainable to children and therefore must be 
there from the first) is the mark of an aboriginal impres- 
sion of companionship in the experience of Nature-prior 
to  human companionship, outlasting it, and outriding its 
vicissitudes. 
I t  is because of this pervasive other life within Nature 
that we feel an “ought” in dealing with it. And because of 
that, science as an object of our united labors stands as a 
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body of truth which we ought to build and which shall abide 
when all its workers shall have passed on. 
W e  may call this recognition of a Life and therefore a 
Meaning within Nature a religious recognition if we will 
--I regard it as empirical fact as well. In that case Science 
and Religion have a t  least one point of contact in affirming 
a value in the universe which in turn will confer meaning 
on the lives of free men. And from that point on, Religion 
may add yet other values without incurring scientific rebuke, 
because the principle of value will have been established, by 
Religion and Science together. 
THE END 



